Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
govin 7e7820f823 deploy: run the MCP server in k3s under the paper-doc namespace
The server has to be reachable by the Harness, Claude Code and Codex, and all
three of those are clients of an address rather than of a source tree — a
stdio child process only serves whichever machine spawned it. So it is packaged
and deployed: namespace `paper-doc`, one Deployment, one NodePort Service at
`http://192.168.1.88:30931/mcp` behind a bearer token, talking to the
in-cluster TiDB Service rather than the node's NodePort.

The namespace is `paper-doc` and not `paper_doc`, which is not a preference:
a namespace name is an RFC 1123 label, underscores are outside that alphabet,
and the API server rejects it outright. The database keeps its underscore.

Two routes were added to the server for the deployment, and they are the only
unauthenticated ones. `/healthz` answers "is this process alive" without
touching anything, `/readyz` answers "can it serve" by running `SELECT 1`. The
split is the point: a failing readiness probe takes the pod out of the
Service's endpoints and puts it back when TiDB returns, while a failing
liveness probe kills a process that was working correctly.

There is no container runtime on this host — k3s runs containerd and neither
`ctr` nor `crictl` builds from a Dockerfile — so `deploy/build-mcp-image.sh`
builds inside a throwaway privileged docker-in-docker pod, mounting the working
tree through a hostPath so the build context is the tree you are looking at,
uncommitted edits included. It reads the registry credentials out of the
cluster's own pull secret, so no password is in the script or in a shell
history. One Dockerfile serves both entry points, because the API and the MCP
server share the domain layer and differ by one argv.

Verified against the deployed Service, not against a local process: 47 MCP
checks pass over the NodePort, and the Node MCP SDK — the one the Harness's
mcp-client plugin uses — lists all 29 tools and calls them. The same 47 pass in
stdio and against a local HTTP server, and the REST suite still passes its 45.
2026-09-21 00:08:17 +08:00
govin 2aff867641 backend: serve the writing domain to agents as an MCP server
The paper is written by a model now. A browser is the wrong client for that:
the work is "generate the paper, then put it in", and doing it through a form
means a person retyping what a model already produced. So the same domain is
served over the Model Context Protocol, which Claude Code, Codex and the
DeepSeek Harness all speak.

It is a third front door, not a second implementation. Every tool is three
lines around an `app.crud` call and validates through `app.schemas`, exactly
as the REST routes do, so a rule fixed in the CRUD layer is fixed on both
surfaces and a paper written by an agent is indistinguishable from one written
by hand. What `app/mcp/` adds is only what a model needs and a browser does
not:

- 29 tools, prefixed `paper_` `paragraph_` `sentence_` `template_` `field_`,
  because a model picks a tool out of a list by name rather than by reading 29
  descriptions;
- results as compact `None`-free JSON, since a tool result is paid for in
  context tokens and `PaperRead.model_dump()` carries four counts and two
  timestamps into every list row;
- paragraphs addressed by **heading** as well as by position. Storage is
  correct as it stands — a sentence remembers the position it sits at, which is
  what makes a template switch non-destructive — but nobody writing
  "1. Introduction" knows the template places it at `sort = 20`. The server
  translates, and refuses with the real heading list when it cannot, so a model
  that guessed wrong corrects itself in one retry;
- `paper_write` and `paper_write_text`: one intention, one call. The latter
  finds its own sections from Markdown headings or from lines that name a
  template heading, and reports every heading it could not place instead of
  writing half a paper;
- `sentence_search` across papers, for consistency rather than retrieval — a
  paper that says 洪水损失 should not be joined by one that says GUL;
- `paper_delete` refuses once, naming what would go with it. A cascading delete
  has no undo in a tool call.

Two transports, one build. `stdio` is what a client spawns — so nothing in the
process may print to stdout, and diagnostics go to stderr. `streamable-http` is
what a client on another machine connects to, optionally behind a bearer token;
binding a non-loopback address disables the SDK's DNS-rebinding allow-list,
because a LAN client sends whatever Host it knows the server by.

Tools register with `structured_output=False` on purpose: inferred from a
`-> str` annotation the SDK publishes a `{"result": ...}` envelope and sends
the JSON twice, once as `structuredContent` and once as text, and clients that
read only one of the two then disagree about what came back.

`scripts/smoke_mcp.py` drives the whole loop through a real MCP client — the
child process and JSON-RPC over stdin/stdout a client actually uses — and runs
unchanged against a running HTTP server via `--url`. 47 checks pass on both
transports; the REST suite still passes its 45.
2026-09-19 00:01:43 +08:00